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ABSTRACT: With direct support of the OECD and the World Bank the East-Central European 
states have been encouraged to adopt and implement codes of conduct and corporate governance 
principles  to  minimize  risk,  boost  performance,  improve  business  access  on  stock  markets, 
strengthening the market position of firms, professional management, demonstrating transparency 
and social responsibility. 
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The political changes of the 1990 in central and eastern European countries have marked the 
beginning of difficult structural reforms in an economic area where there were no shareholders and 
capital markets, the state acting as sole owner under a command economy incompatible with the 
competitive environment. For corporate governance to be relevant two basic measures needed to be 
implemented: the privatization of former state enterprises and building an appropriate institutional 
infrastructure for ensuring financial discipline in a highly vulnerable business environment. The 
privatization process has been the mainstay of structural reforms in Central and Eastern European 
countries and experienced different rates between these countries. Thus, in Poland in the period 
1990-1992, over 80% of state enterprises were privatized, and in Hungary 59%, in countries like the 
Czech  Republic  and  Bulgaria,  most  privatizations  have  been  carried  out  in  1990-1995,  while 
privatization in Romania did not start until 1992. 
After 2002 corporate governance began to be regarded as an objective measure necessary to 
de-politicize  decision-making,  to  protect  minority  shareholders  and  to  stop  the  destruction  of 
companies’  property  after  the  closing  process  of  mass  privatization.  The  main  function  of  the 
management of a company being to promote corporate interests so the main task consisting  in 
maximizing shareholder value. 
Currently, OECD and World Bank are the main entities involved in addressing the stage of 
implementation and applicability of the principles of corporate governance codes of conduct in the 
field. In 2004 OECD has outlined and published reference levels of indicators that upon analyzing, 
processing  and  interpretation  evidence  show  the  implementation  or  not  of  the  principles  of 
corporate governance. These  indicators are  important for investors, policy makers, stakeholders 
groups, the corporations that take care of their value prove the existence of a strong system of 
governance. 
In 2006, the World Bank released the results of a study based on impressive research efforts, 
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which have stretched from 2001 to 2006 in 17 transition countries. The study examines changes in 
corporate  governance  practices  assessing  how  to  comply  with  its  principles,  namely  those 
concerning  the  protection  of  shareholders,  fair  treatment  for  all  shareholders,  the  role  of 
stakeholders, respecting the principles of information and transparency, and also the accountability 
of the Administration Council. 
For each principle were applied evaluation factors from 1 (lowest) to Level 5 (best), as 
follows: O (Observed)- 5 points; LO (Largely Observed) - 4 points; PO (Partially Observed) - 3 
points; MNO (Materially Not Observed) - 2 points; NO (Not Observed) - 1 point. 
Based on public data provided by the World Bank, Mihaela Onofrei (Onofrei M., 2009)  
performed an analysis of the implementation of each principle, synthesized the most important of 
them. The study presents the analysis of the principles of corporate governance in 11 Central and 
Eastern European countries, of which nine new member of the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and two states of the 
former Yugoslavia (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). In the analysis performed (Onofrei M., 2009)   
the starting point was to analyze the implementation of each principle.  
The implementation of the principle for shareholder-rights protection -the most important 
principle-  is  verified  by  the  shareholder  involvement  in  decision  making,  voting  rights,  the 
acquisition or loss of control over the corporation through the capital market. After processing the 
data recorded the best qualifying country is Poland, while our country gets only 3 points thanks PO 
qualifier (McGee R., 2008).  In terms of shareholder involvement in decision making and the exercise 
of voting rights (as representative factors impacting on principle), the study reveals that in general, 
shareholders are involved in decision-making process, Hungary was the only one who receives 
maximum score for this indicator, also shareholders exercise their right to vote ” to a large extent“, 
Lithuania receives the maximum score. Romania has a relatively constant position, a medium level, 
and its rating is “Largely Observed”. With regard to capital structure and distribution control, the 
study concludes that there is no risk of hostile takeovers in companies from 11 analyzed countries, 
given that financing through the stock exchange is not significant, because capital markets in this 
area are still emerging markets.  
Fair  treatment  of  all  shareholders  is  a  principle  with  important  role  in  creating  an 
atmosphere  of  mutual  understanding  among  the  shareholders  due  to  their  equal  treatment, 
preventing  potential  conflicts  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders.  The  analysis  was 
performed on two major factors, namely the protection of minority shareholders against the abuse 
of major-shareholders and distribution of documents and materials of interest to all shareholders, it 
shows  a much better  protection of minority  shareholders  to the distribution  of documents  and 
materials  of  interest  to  all  shareholders.  For  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  against 
controlling shareholders abuse, eight countries from those analyzed receive the mark LO, e.g. 4 
points for each country. In connection with the second factor, the distribution of results is carried 
out  on  four  levels  of  assessment,  it  is  found  that  four  countries  (Latvia,  Lithuania,  Slovakia, 
Croatia) receive 4 points and the rate LO, four countries (Romania, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary) 3 
points and grade given is PO, in the case of Bulgaria it is used for the first time the NO grade and in 
case of Czech Republic the indicator is accomplished in a small extent. The stakeholders categories 
have the right to be informed about the enterprise activity and their results, also their interests must 
be protected based on corporate social responsibility. The analysis of this principle  has started 
issuing its recognition by corporate governance systems of the 11 states, taking into account two 
representative factors which contribute to good implementation of the principle: the opportunities 
for  the  efficient  resolution  of  complaints  of  stakeholders  and  enhancing  group  performance 
mechanisms for active participation of stakeholders in decision making. The analysis showed that 
the role of stakeholders groups is widely recognized in 9 of the 11 countries analyzed, except 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, where there is a low performance of that principle. Regarding the 




made by stakeholders are resolved extensively in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the mechanisms of active participation of stakeholders in 
decision-making have allowed better implementation of the principle in the analyzed states. It also 
points  out  that  on  the  first  factor,  our  country  gets  a  good  result,  while  the  second  level  of 
implementation  is  low,  because  interest  groups  (stakeholders)  is  little  known  in  corporate 
governance culture in our country. In Romania we meet two categories of interest groups whose 
interests are taken into account in decision making: the employees and creditors. However, none of 
them is systematically treated by the Board of Directors as a legitimate interest group. 
 
Implementing corporate governance principles in Eastern Europe 
Implementing  the  principle  of  information  and  transparency  is  the  responsibility  of 
corporate  management,  which  is  responsible  both  for  the  quality  of  information  available  to 
interested parties as well as how to collaborate with internal and external auditors. The World Bank 
study starts from the needs for information in a timely and fair manner to all stakeholders, analyzing 
the standards for disseminating and auditing information. The results of analyze suggest how it is 
implemented this principle and have led to the conclusion that states have some problems in the 
issues  of  transparency  and  access  to  information,  the  best  ratio  recorded  is  only  "partially 
observed". Also, the two states of the former Yugoslavia and Slovakia were rated as "observed in a 
small way". Implementing the principle in action is conditioned by several factors, most important 
being the audit independence and honesty, punctuality and cost effective access to information. 
According to data presented in the study review, audit independence appears to be the biggest 
problem - no state has a maximum rating, the best being "Partially observed" (7 cases). Romania 
has a low grade, "noted in small extent" this also being the case for Lithuania and Croatia too. The 
second factor does not create problems, since there are two countries (Hungary, Poland) receiving 
top ratings. Also, there is a uniform distribution, with 4 states, both rated "Observed in a large 
extent", as well as a "Partially observed" (among which Romania). 
The Board of Directors is the cornerstone of corporate governance system and its role is to 
control and supervision of managers. Regarding the responsibility of the Board, the data survey 
shows that the Board fulfills in part, in a limited duty the principle of acting in a responsible and 
careful manner.  Implementing  the  action  is  conditional  on  several  factors, which  may  indicate 
compliance with the  law, the full realization of the functions and independence of directors to 
managers. Analysis of these factors showed a contradictory situation, on one hand largely according 
to the law on the other hand the board does not completely fulfill its functions. This means that its 
action is highly formal, that there are regulations, but they are not applied in practice. Regarding the 
independence of the managers, there is limited and even reduced, the independence of the Board is 
seriously questionable if one takes into account the fact that in four cases (among which Romania) 
we have found the "Observed in a lesser extent" rating. Prevailing verdict is "Partially observed"(5 
states) and supports the formal statement of the board acting as stated above. Following tabulation 
and processing of the points adjectives, we obtain a ranking for the 11 countries analyzed, Table 1. 
 
Table no. 1.  
Situation of implementing corporate governance principles (aggregate score) 
No.  Country  P I  P II  P III  P IV  P V  Total  Rank 
1.  Bulgaria  4  4  3  3  2  16  V 
2.  Czech  4  3  2  3  3  15  VI 
3.  Letonia  4  4  4  4  3  19  II 
4.  Lithuania  4  4  4  3  4  19  II 
5.  Romania  3  3  4  3  3  16  V 
6.  Poland  5  4  5  4  4  22  I 




8.  Slovenia  4  4  4  3  4  19  II 
9.  Hungary  3  4  4  4  3  18  III 
10.  Croatia  4  3  4  2  4  17  IV 
11.  Bosnia and Herzegovina  4  3  4  2  2  15  VI 
Source:  Mihaela Onofrei, Corporate Financial Governance 
 
  Centralized  data leads  to  a hierarchy  with  six  levels,  from  the  highest  score, 22 points 
(Poland), to the lowest- 15 points (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Romania, under the circumstances, is 
in 5th place with 16 points, tied with Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
  The privatization process in Romania has highlighted the needs for implementing corporate 
governance rules, for at least two reasons, improving property management practices of companies 
privatized and transfer of control of political bodies to specialized administrative councils. When 
setting up companies resulting from the transformation of former state enterprises, the state gave up 
the goods as a contribution to the capital of these companies.  
  The privatization process in Romania was confronted with a number of difficulties related to 
economic  constraints,  including  lack  of  domestic  capital  as  being  the  most  acute,  technical 
constraints related to lack of experience or lack of accounting rules and institutional abuse matters. 
In  this  respect,  one  of  the  major  problems  was  the  lack  of  autonomy  of  the  new  company 
transformed from AVAS, former SOF (State Ownership Fund).The fact that the general meeting of 
shareholders in these companies is made up of representatives of AVAS deepens the dependence on 
the State, amputates the divisions autonomy, increases the degree of centralization and obedience. 
Abuse of the state as a shareholder was regulated by law, because by Article 21 of Company Law 
No. 31/1990 has established the rule that the state was the sole shareholder until partial or full 
privatization of the company concerned, the general meeting being excluded (Piperea Gh., 2005). In 
this context, the powers were exercised by the council of the General Assembly empowered the 
state to start the privatization process. 
  After the onset of the first privatization law (Law no.58/1991), the empowered state board 
has been replaced by the General Assembly of Shareholders (GMS) and the Board of Directors was 
established. The fact that members of both governing bodies were appointed and not elected by the 
State Property Fund, the Private Property Fund, created great confusion between the AGA and the 
Council.  In  addition,  state-owned  companies  have  many  employees,  so  this  social  component 
becomes very important for the management, including the negotiating terms for a privatization 
contract. 
  In Central and Eastern European states, protection of employment in privatized companies 
has affected the privatization process in different ways.  In the early  years of privatization, the 
objective of preserving the initial level of employment was achieved indirectly by using the method 
of privatization MEBO (Management and Employees Buy-Out), which is a form of procurement 
which is taking over a company by managers and employees of that company, which guaranteed job 
security (derived from the dual role as an employee and owner). After MEBO transactions began to 
lose ground, the concern that privatized companies will generate significant unemployment began 
to be reflected in legal amendments introduced for this purpose in the privatization legislation. 
  Privatization contracts cannot reasonably include clauses on the situation of employees. In 
addition offering compensation for the compulsory redundant staff, but without clearly stipulating 
who bears the obligation to pay such compensation, is a political error generating inflation, but with 
a favorable impact on the electorate. In turn, the wages were the main instrument of negotiation 
between  authorities  and  unions,  often  not  correlated  with  wage  labor productivity  growth,  left 
governments preferring to accept increases in wages without coverage on productive performance, 
all this is the price of remaining in power. Thus, transforming unions into a force to be reckoned, 
against  diluting  the  authority  of  the  Council  and  AGA,  had  negative  effects  on  the  financial 




even if they had loss  and lack the necessary structural reforms. 
  In  this  context,  implementing  corporate  governance  rules  was  seen  as  a  saving  way  to 
harmonize internal business requirements of a functioning market economy. In 2001, was adopted 
the  corporate  governance  standards,  the  Code  of  Management  and  Administration,  targeting 
publicly owned companies listed on Bucharest Stock Exchange. Market reaction was to reject rather 
than accept, given the content and the possible implications of the code. The code refers primarily 
to  the  minority  shareholders,  other  investors  are  protected  through  periodic  and  continuous 
information,  the  principle  of  investor  protection,  specifying  their  rights  (economic  and  non-
property) and also their obligations (Piperea Gh., 2005). Its application has a narrow edge, as it is 
intended only for those companies that are in the PLUS category on Bucharest Stock Exchange, 
even if rules are binding. Thus, the issuer is required to include them in its constituent documents, 
otherwise he would be excluded from the trading category. 
  In terms of applicability of corporate governance standards, Romania has made important 
efforts, but the analysis presented in the previous paragraph placed it near the end of the ranking 
drawn up for the 11 states in 2006. On this occasion the World Bank had specific recommendations 
for each state examined. In the case of Romania they have launched two major themes of reflection: 
the need to increase the Board's role and the need for the introduction of specialized committees to 
advise the board, including accurate and timely  preparation of financial statements. It was also 
recommended that at General Meetings of Shareholders of listed companies to take part external 
auditors to provide explanations for how the shareholders and the investment had honored their 
obligations under the privatization contract.  
According to a study made by Applied Economics Group, based on a survey of Institute for 
Marketing  and  Polls  (http://  www.  Euractiv  .ro/uniunea-europeana  /articles  %7CdisplayArticle 
/articleID_10508/), in which 153 manufacturing firms took part, a representative sample based on 
the turnover, number of employees and regional distribution, published in the October edition of the 
Bulletin of Industrial Quarterly 29/05/2007, three quarters of companies states that do not know and 
apply the OECD corporate governance principles. The same document shows that 77.8% of the 
companies are not aware of corporate governance principles (15.7% know them, and 6.5% do not 
know / no answer), while 79.7% of firms states that they do not apply these principles. Applied 
Economics Group Experts say it is possible that several firms are applying these principles, but not 
knowing  that,  given  that  only  34.7% of  companies  do  not  have  a  written  code  of  conduct  to 
establish  formal  rights  and  responsibilities  of  members  of  the  Applied  Economics  Group  and 
management, mean of communication and reporting between managers and shareholders, t 31.3% 
of  companies  shareholders  do  not  receive  in  advance  the  documents  that  will  be  discussed  at 
general  meetings  of  shareholders,  and  26.2%,  minority  shareholders  do  not  have  access  to 
accounting  books.  30.8%  of  these  companies  had  not  published,  until  May  2007,  a  report on 
business activity in 2006, while 79.7% of firms have not changed the company’s auditor in the last 
three  years.  It  underlines  the  need  to  organize  public  debates  to  a  better  understanding  and 
implementation of these principles in the Romanian business environment, possibly enforced by 
legal mechanisms.  
To see the entire image on the business environment in Romania we show only a few aspects of 
Press Release of 31 October 2007, which includes the Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, 
released by the World Economic Forum, which places Romania on the 74 of 131 countries in drop a 
place to position 73 of the last report. Overall, the report concludes, Romania has stagnated in the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008. Among EU countries, Romania ranks 26 of 27, just 
ahead of  Bulgaria. According  to the report,  Romania  is placed  on  investing  in  category-based 
economies, where the determinants of competitiveness related to education, the level of internal 
competition,  labor  market,  financial  market,  the  technological  training  (capacity  to  absorb 
technologies) and market size. Romania has competitive disadvantages in particular as regarding: 




intensity of  local  competition (No. 82), the tax burden (No. 108)  existence of  next-generation 
technology (instead of 93), private R&D expenditure (No. 89), the collaboration between academia 
and business (90th).  The most important issues facing the business are the tax and fiscal legislation. 
Corruption, inadequate infrastructure and political instability are also among the major obstacles, 
while inflation is not as top priority. 
 












Fig. no. 1 Main obstacles in business 
Source: www.Euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_10508/ 
 
One of the main aspects of corporate governance in Romania identified by the White Paper 
on Corporate Governance in South Eastern Europe are the weak institutional framework and lack of 
priority in the implementation of existing laws, one of the most serious weaknesses is the of breach 
minority shareholder rights, which would require private sector take the lead in implementing and 
promoting public debate on corporate governance issues. 
In Romania as in other countries of Central and South-East companies are characterized by 
the  same  general  model  based  on  corporate  governance  and  internal  control  employees 
management, but certain features based on the condition of national economic, social, political, 
cultural  specific  forms  of  governance  have  emerged  and  developed.  Corporate  governance  of 
Romanian enterprises can be analyzed and understood only through the development of the reform 
process in the context of transition from planned economy to market economy, a process which led 
to profound changes in the micro universe. To understand this phenomenon must mention the main 
methods  of  privatization  that  generated  private  sector  training  in  Romania:  MEBO  mass 
privatization program and selling stakes to investors from outside companies. These processes have 
led to the formation of the following types of privatization of government enterprises: 
State-owned companies or companies not fully privatized, the state is still a shareholder. 
Within these there is inevitably a conflict of interest between managers, employees and the state, 
resulting in contradictory objectives: maximizing profits, maintaining employment, tax revenues 
growth, political interests or individual satisfaction. Economic performance is the major objective 
of these economic entities, the interests of directors of these companies are rarely subordinated to 
the interests of shareholders. 
Closed-private firms (small, medium or large), whose shares are not traded on an official 
market. Owners are usually managers, there isn't in this respect no conflict of interests between 
them. But there are many conflicts between partners who degenerates into civil litigation. Also 
managers do not seek to maximize the value of the company priority, but rather expanding the 
business. 
- Companies privatized or opened, who knows a variety of forms, from those with a very 
dispersed shareholders whose rights are often neglected by those in which shareholders have a 
strong  control  over  the  enterprise.  These  conflicts  occur  between  management  companies  and 
minority shareholders and between majority shareholder and minority shareholders. As with private 




firms  closed,  autonomous  decision  making  and  operational  management  team  is  high, 
organizational structures and information systems are flexible, dynamic and effective economic and 
financial levers used predominantly as a management tool. 
It is thus evident from the presentation forms of existing companies that the main problem 
of  corporate  governance  reform  in  Romania  is  made  up  of  triple  conflicts  that  arise  between 
controlling  shareholders  and  minority  shareholders,  which  generates  differences  between 
management, the Board of Directors and minority shareholders and conflicts shareholders of the 
company's  business  partners,  especially  phenomena  in  transition  economies,  causing  long  term 
performance degradation for companies and even bankruptcy. 
The  structure  of  companies  listed  on  BSE  and  RASDAQ  have  identified  five  major 
categories  of  investors:  strategic  investors,  employees  associations(  Employees  Associations), 
institutional investors, the state represented by AVAS (Authority for Privatization and Management 
of State Property) and  individual investors. 
The  most  common  forms  of  violation  of  shareholder  rights,  according  to  studies  by 
international institutions on capital market in Romania consists of dilution of minority shareholders 
property, transfer of profits outside the company, unfair allocation of profits or delay in providing 
dividends as well minority shareholders and limited access to information. A pertinent explanation 
for the creation of these cases were found in excessive authority in the controlling shareholders and 
the lack of control and a strong monitoring from other enterprise business partners. Due to the high 
degree of concentration of ownership, the company's governing bodies - Board of Directors, the 
directors and managers, are subordinate to the majority owner and consequently acts to satisfy the 
interests of that. 
Romania occupies only 7th place with a total score of 20.6 out of 36 maximum possible 
points from a sample of 10 countries like Greece, Israel, Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Russia and 
others, from a study conducted SG Equity Research for Emerging Markets [2000] on the efficiency 
and quality of  governance relations  between the firm  and  its  social partners.  Among the most 
important weaknesses of corporate governance in Romania revealed by this study are those related 
to unequal access to information for all shareholders, the prohibition of transactions for internal or 
majority shareholders, the role of the Board decreased access to other investors information media 
etc.  Although  the  situation  in  Romania  does  not  differ  very  much  from  the  other  countries 
examined,  the  most  acute  problem  is  regarding  the  enforcement  of  legal  action  regarding 
shareholders, within the meaning of real impossibility request their legal rights. 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the Romanian companies traded on the stock market have resulted from either 
MEBO privatization process, mass privatization or sale of shares, which led to the formation of 
extremely desperate ownership, no activism in managing companies and, on the other hand, has 
triggered a strong majority or significant shareholders. These companies have opened a form of 
governance  dominated  by  management  and  control  of  employees  or  controlling  shareholders 
against  minority  shareholders';  interests  and  other  social  partners,  which  could  generate  with 
violation of minority shareholders and reduce their assets by controlling shareholders, Board of 
Directors and auditors having only a formal role, so the ineffective governance of companies had 
influenced in a negative way the economic outcomes and their ability to develop financial future by 
pursuing  especially  short-term  employees  and  managers  interests  (and  salary  increases  of 
allowances)  with  no  interest  in  achieving  stability  and  job  security.  Also  failure  of  corporate 
governance principles reduces the pace of restructuring and corporate reorganization or bankruptcy 
of some firms postponing in financial difficulty. It can be find abusive situation's, like  sales of 
assets  of  firms,  or  investment  failure  of  modernization,  maintenance  or  development  of  the 
productive potential of enterprises. Inefficient government takeover could lead to abuse of shares 




by  destructive  methods  of  mitigation  and  transfer  of  wealth  of  minority  shareholders,  or  the 
emergence of conflicts between shareholders and minority shareholders. You cannot apply in these 
circumstances,  managers  pay  programs  based  on  the  actual  value  created,  no  promotion  and 
incentive  programs  for  staff  on  the  criterion  value,  which  can  lead  to  excessive  mobility  of 
employees or to maintain an atmosphere strained as a result of conflict between management and / 
or  employees.  Distributions  of  situations  may  occur  late  or  even  non-delivery  of  shareholder 
dividends in order to provide incentives to employees and managers at the end. Other consequences 
arising from the inefficiency of corporate governance system can be linked to restrict trading of 
securities on  the  capital market,  leading  to  increased volatility and  risk  of  investment  in  these 
securities, or other inability of the active involvement of social partners, for eg. banks , the head of 
the company.  Failure to comply with the principles of transparency of information, providing 
information and poor quality due to their lack of sufficient guarantees, can cause reduced access to 
bank loans or even loss of prestige of the firms listed on the market, or impossibility of making 
acquisitions or takeovers by other firms from the field in order to improve the activity of their 
respective owners. 
Thus corporate governance system-listed companies determine the current economic and 
financial performance, but investor expectations regarding their future development opportunities. 
In these circumstances, on one hand how quality management and leadership is a key variable for 
assessing non-financial performance of companies listed on global stock market. On the other hand, 
capital  markets  functions  through  the  redeployment  of  capital  funding  available  and  the  most 
profitable investment, can significantly contribute to improving governance of listed companies and 
thus  to  improve  their  performance  through  mergers  or  acquisitions  and  active  involvement  of 
institutional investors in their management. 
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